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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

HOWARD B. CAHOON,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
Case
No. 8976

- vsROBERT P. PELTON,
Defendant and Appellarnt.

BRIEF 0'F RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff, Howard B. Cahoon, married his wife,
Dorothy Cahoon, in Salt Lake City, Utah, on June 28,
1947. (Exhibit P-2). He met his wife approximately a
year before the marriage while she was working as a
waitress at the Hotel Utah. (R. 185, 188, 446, 480). Mrs.
Cahoon had two daughters by a previous marriage. Plaintiff adopted the two girls in about 1953. (R. 157, 456).
Plaintiff, his wife and the two girls lived in Salt
Lake until about 1950. During this time plaintiff and his
wife worked together in the Jiffy Dog business. She
would get up early in the morning, make and package
1
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sandwiches, and then he would take the family car and
deliver them to the various places in Salt Lake. ~Irs.
Cahoon worked on an average of five or six hours per
day. (R. 163, 164, 460). This was plaintiff's first marriage. (R. 156). Plaintiff and his wife loved each other very
much. While living in Salt Lake City they visited their
relatives, attended screenings together, took trips together and enjoyed each others company. ~Irs. Cahoon
was an excellent mother and wife. (R. 164, 165, 459 and
460). After moving to Las Vegas in about 1950, the relationship between plaintiff and his -wife continued good.
They attended conventions together, \\orked together in
the drive-in theaters, took trips together, went picnicking,
horseback riding and swimming with the children. (R.
166-171, 466-471). Because of the nature of their business
plaintiff and his wife were together a great deal.
Plaintiff and his wife had two children, "Andra" and
"Brit". Dr. A. A. Anderson of Salt Lake Cit:, "Ctah, took
care of nirs. Cahoon at the time of the delivery of Andra.
The doctor in August of 1949, took a blood sample from
jfr. and :Mrs. Cahoon and found that they had blood
types that might cause trouble -with future pregnancies.
The doctor called both :Jir. and :Jirs. Cahoon into his
office and advised them of the danger of having a second
child and also of having a third child because of their
blood types. (R. 292-299, 68-!-690). :Jirs. Cahoon at times
would eomplain to plaintiff that they were not having
sexual relations as often as perhaps they should. (R.192).
On one occasion soon after ~Irs. Cahoon became pregnant
with Brit the matter of not enough sexual intercourse
came up during the eonversation. Plaintiff in a burst of

2
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anger stated to his wife that if they didn't have enough
sexual intercourse then the baby must not be his. He was
immediately sorry. He knew there was no foundation
for what he said and he apologized. (R. 201, 202, 616, 617
and 621-3). We call the court's attention to the article
in Exhibit P-3 regarding plaintiff's son, Brit, and plaintiff's testimony on pages 201, 202, 204, 205 and 501 and
502 of the record concerning the paternity of his son.
Plaintiff completely answers any claim that he ever
denied paternity of his son.
Plaintiff and his wife were introduced to Mr. Pelton
in November of 1954. Mrs. Cahoon came to Salt Lake
in June or July of 1955 and stayed for a period of three
or four weeks. Plaintiff and his wife came to Salt Lake
during the Christmas holidays of 1955 and stayed one
week. Mrs. Cahoon was in Salt Lake again for a period
of four or five weeks in June or July of 1956. (R. 363,
472). The next time defendant saw Mrs. Cahoon after
their introduction was in Salt Lake City in the summer
of 1955. (R. 333, 584). That fall defendant saw Mrs.
Cahoon in Las Vegas. (R. 334, 585). Defendant wrote two
or three letters per month to Mrs. Cahoon and called her
five or six times from Salt Lake City between June, 1955
and June, 1956. (R. 334, 335, 337, 588). Mr. Pelton went
through Las Vegas quite often and tried to call her on
each occasion. He took her for a ride in his airplane. He
saw Mrs. Cahoon in her mother's home in Salt Lake in
December, 1955, when her husband was not present. Mr.
Pelton took a fishing trip to Lake Mead in January or
February, 1956, and at that time took Mrs. Cahoon out
to dinner. He met her while Mrs. Cahoon was riding in

3
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a boat with her daughter on Lake Mead. Mrs. Cahoon
got into Mr. Pelton's boat. (R. 336-340, 587-591). Mrs.
Cahoon and defendant went horseback riding in Evanston, Wyoming. They were alonewhile driving from Salt
Lake City to Evanston and returning. Defendant kissed
~1rs. Cahoon on several occasions both while she was
here in Salt Lake City in the summer of 1955 and in 1956
and when he saw her in Las Vegas. (R. 341, 357, 592).
Defendant told Mrs. Cahoon he was fond of her and she
said she was fond of him. (R. 345, 596). Mrs. Cahoon told
}fr. Pelton she loved him and he let her know that he
returned her feelings. (R. 351, 602). They danced. He sent
her a Valentine card and a bathing suit for her birthday.
(R. 344, 360, 595, 611). Roxanne, plaintiff's daughter,
testified that she saw Mr. Pelton for the first time in the
Cahoon home in Las Vegas; that he was in the Cahoon
home on four or five occasions and most of the time
that was in the evening. He sta~~ed there as long as an
hour to an hour and one-half. That :Jir. Pelton kissed her
mother while in the kitchen of the home in the presence
of some of Roxanne's friends. That defendant borrowed
a swimn1ing suit from Roxanne's boy friend, and defendant and Mrs. Cahoon left the house about 10:00 o'clock at
night and did not return until about 10:00 o'clock the
next day. (R. 271-278, 519-52±). On one occasion Roxanne
took her mother to the ~~qua ~Iotel in Las Yegas and
left her there with ~Ir. Pelton for about an hour and
one-half. When Roxanne returned ~Ir. Pelton and her
1nother were alone in the n1otel and were having some
drinks together (R. 276, 277, 524). Defendant kissed her
while in the 1notel. (R. 353, 60±). Roxanne picked up let4
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ters from defendant on four or five occasions addressed
to a Ginger Cameron. (R. 277, 526). Roxanne was about
fifteen years old during this time.
Plaintiff's daughter, Sylvia, testified she met the defendant once in their home. (R. 262, 511). She also picked
up letters three or four times at the post office.
Roxanne finally told her father about Mr. Pelton in
about September of 1956. Plaintiff and his wife separated
soon thereafter.
Sometime in December, 1956, Richard C. Cahoon,
brother of the plaintiff, had a conversation with the
defendant during which he asked the defendant if he was
going to marry Dorothy. When he asked the defendant,
"Why did you ever go to Howard's home in front of his
children~", the defendant said, "He didn't. That he would
call her and she would meet him at his hotel or in town".
Richard ·Cahoon asked the defendant about the time when
he borrowed the swimming suit, and why he kissed
Dorothy in front of the children. The defendant shrugged
his shoulders and said there was no harm in that. Mr.
Calwon asked the defendant during this conversation
why he slept with Dorothy in Howard's home and the
defendant replied, "I never slept with her in the home,
when I slept with her it was in a hotel or in Salt Lake
City when the children weren't around." The defendant
also stated to Mr. Cahoon, "I'm not the first one to sleep
with Mrs. Cahoon besides her husband". (R. 302-305,
540-541).
5
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Wayne B. Thiriot, a close friend of plaintiff and his
wife, in the summer of 1956 was visiting in Salt Lake
and did see Mrs. Cahoon and the defendant together in
the Variety Club in Salt Lake. Mr. Thiriot had stopped
in the Club late at night to get a drink and while there
he saw Mrs. Cahoon sitting on a couch with a gentleman.
This gentleman had his arms around her and was kissing
her for sometime. Mr. Thiriot watched them for several
minutes before Mrs. Cahoon finally became aware of the
fact that he was there. Mrs. Cahoon introduced the gentleman she was with as Mr. Pelton. (R. 242-247, 558-563).
Early in 1956 plaintiff first noticed a change in his
wife's attitude toward him. She became indifferent to
going out on Saturday night, was upset when plaintiff
cancelled a fishing trip at the last minute, seemed happy
when plaintiff left town on his film buying trips and did
not want to attend a convention and engage in other
activities that they had done before. (R.169-17-±, 473-475).

STATE1\fENT OF POINTS
POINT I
THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN PLAINTIFF AND HIS WIFE
WAS VALID.
POINT II
AN ACTION FOR CRIMINAL CONVERSATION IS RECOGNIZED UNDER NEVADA LAW AND UTAH LAW AND
PUNITIVE DAMAGES MAY BE RECOVERED IN SUCH
ACTION. (SEE DEFENDANT'S POINTS II AND III)
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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POINT III
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN GRANTING A NEW
TRIAL ON THE FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION.
A.

PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL WAS
TIMELY.

B.

THE EFFECT OF THE ·COURTS ORDER GRANTING
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL WAS TO
GRANT A NEW TRIAL ON BOTH CAUSES OF ACTION.

C.

THE EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO SHOW THAT
MRS. CAHOON'S AFFECTIONS WERE ALIENATED
OUTSIDE THE STA'TE OF NEVADA.
POINT IV

IT WAS NOT ERROR TO GIVE INSTRUCTION NO. 11.
(R. 124-125).

POINT V
PLAINTIFF IS NOT BARRED FROM BRINGING 'THE
.A:CTIONS IN QUESTION BE.CAUSE OF THE FACT THAT
PLAINTIFF'S WIFE OBTAINED THE DIVORCE.
POINT VI
PLAINTIFF WAS ENTITLED TO RECOVER DAMAGES
FOR FUTURE OR PERMANENT LOSS OF HIS WIFE'S
SERVICES, AFFECTION, CONSORTIUM AND SOCIETY.
(SEE DEFENDANT'S POINT VII)
POINT VII
I'T WAS NOT ERROR FOR THE COURT TO INSTRUCT
THE JURY ON THE LIFE EXPECTANCY TABLE NOR TO
PERMIT COUNSEL TO ARGUE THE SAME 'TO THE JURY.

7
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POINT VIII
IF THE COS'T OF SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S WIFE
IS AN OFFSET AT ALL, IT MAY ONLY BE OFFSET AGAINST THE $2,500 THAT WAS AWARDED ON THE CAUSE
OF ACTION FOR ALIENATION OF AFFECTIONS.
POINT IX
THE COURT CORRECTLY PERMITTED PLAINTIFF TO
READ DEPOSITIONS OF WITNESSES IN WHICH 'THE
WITNESSES CLAIMED THEIR P R IV I LEGE AGAINST
SELF-INCRIMINATION. (SEE DEFENDANT'S POINT X
AND XI)
POINT X
THE COURTS REFUSAL TO GIVE DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 20 WAS NOT PREJUDICIAL.
POINT XI
THE GIVING OF INSTRUCTION NO. 13 WAS NOT PREJUDICIAL ERROR.
POINT XII
THERE WAS NO ERROR IN REFUSING TO GRANT A
NEW TRIAL ON GROUND THAT THE VERDICT WAS EXCESSIVE.

.ARGU:JIEXT
POINT I
THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN PLAINTIFF AND HIS WIFE
WAS VALID.

Doroth)r Cahoon obtained an interlocutory decree
of divorre in the State of California on l\farch 19, 1946.
She 1narried the plaintiff, Howard Cahoon, in Salt Lake
City, Utah, on June '27, 1947. On June 23, 1948, the final
judg1nent of divorce was entered by the California
8provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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court and was ordered entered nunc pro tunc as of June
1, 1947. Since the entry of the final decree of divorce
Dorothy Cahoon and plaintiff, Howard Cahoon, have
lived together as husband and wife in the States of Utah
and Nevada. Two children were born as issue of that
marriage.
Section 133 of the Civil Code of California is quoted
at length on page 19 of defendant's brief. We will not
quote it again.
The legal effect of the California statute has been determined by the California court in several cases. In
Macedo vs. Macedo} 29 Cal.App.2nd, 387, 84 P.2d 552, the
parties were married in February, 1932, and lived together until 1936 when they separated. The appellant in
this case then brought an action to annul the marriage
on the ground that at the time of the marriage, Mary
:Macedo had a husband who was living. Mary Macedo had
commenced an action against her husband one Moreira
and an interlocutory decree of divorce had been entered
on September 10, 1930. The present action for annulment
was filed on November 6, 1936. On November 16, 1936,
Mary JHacedo, the defendant in this case, procured the
entry of the final decree in the Moreira case nunc pro
tunc as of September 11, 1931.
The court held that the entry of the decree nunc pro
tunc was valid and hence that the marriage between the
appellant who is the plaintiff in this case was valid with
the defendant, Mary Macedo. The trial court's action in
dismissing plaintiff's complaint for annulment was affirmed.
9
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For other California cases to the same effect see
Ringel vs. Superior Court of Alemeda County, 128 P.2d
558, 54 Cal.App.2d 34 (1942); In Re Hughes Estate, 182
P. 2d 253 80 Cal. App. 2d 550; Hamrick vs. Hamrick, 260
P. 2d 188, 119 Cal. App. 2d 839.
The courts of States other than California have had
occasion to construe the California statute authorizing the
entry of a final judgment of divorce nunc pro tunc.
Shippee vs. Shippee, 66 A.2d 77, 95 N.H. 450 (1949) involved an action by the plaintiff husband to annul his
n1arriage with the defendant. Plaintiff and defendant
were married in New York on April 5, 1946. On October
18, 1944, the defendant was granted an interlocutory decree of divorce from her prior husband by a California
court. On February 25, 1948, a final judgment of divorce
was entered by the California court. Plaintiff's petition
for annulment of the marriage was filed April 29, 1948.
On l\1ay 13, 1948, the California court entered an order
which directed the clerk to enter the final judgment of
divorce nunc pro tunc as of October 24, 1945.
In discussing the legal effect of the nunc pro tunc
entry of the final judgn1ent of divorce, the New Hampshire court said, "The validity of the marriage ceremony
performed in New York on April1946, depends upon the
law of that state."
The New !Iampshire court went on to say.
"The judgment of the California court entered May 13, 1948, that the parties to that action
were finally divorced as of October 24, 1945, is
conclusive upon all other courts including those
10
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of New York. * * * A judgment previously entered
nunc pro tunc must be everywhere received and
enforced in the same manner as though entered
at the proper time. (See I Freeman Judgments
Fifth Edition, page 2'63; 49 C.J.S. Sec. 121, page
256).
The New Hampshire court then cites Giuliano vs.
Giul~ano, 163 Misc. 655, 297 N.Y.S. 238, which holds that
it is not contrary to the public policy of New York to recognize a decree of divorce entered by a West Virginia
court nunc pro tunc and that such decree is binding upon
the courts of New York. A second marriage in the State
of New York was held valid although a previous divorce
in West Virginia was made final by a nunc pro tunc decree in the latter State that was not entered until. three
years after the divorce and one year after the second
marriage in New York. The New York court in the
Giuliano case said,
"It was entered in West Virginia in 1935 nunc
pro tunc as of August, 1932, which was an adjudication of that court that the divorce should date
as of 1932. We may not question the procedure of
the West Virginia court. Its decree is binding as
of the date it fixed."
The New Hampshire court went on to say,
Since the judgment of the California court declaring the divorce of defendant to be effective
as of October 24, 1945, is conclusive upon all other
courts, it follows that the marriage of the parties
on April 5, 1946, should be declared valid. There
is no public policy in this state contrary to such
result. The trial courts action in denying the petition for annulment was affirmed and the trial
11
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courts action in granting the defendant a divorce
was also affirmed."

Bannister vs. Bannister, 181 Md. 177, 29 A.2d 287
was an action by the plaintiff husband against his wife
for annuhnent of their mariage. Plaintiff and defendant
were married on 1Iarch 10, 1935, in the State of California. The defendant on October 16, 1929, had obtained
an interlocutory decree of divorce in the State of California from her previous husband. The final decree of
divorce was entered in California on ~fay 27, 1935. On
April 4, 1942, the California court entered another order
directing that the final decree of divorce be entered nunc
pro tunc as of October 18, 1930.
The Maryland Supreme Court held that the nunc pro
tunc entry by the California court was effective as of the
date the final judgment was ordered entered by the
California court so that the marriage of plaintiff and
defendant was valid.

In Re Kelley's Estate, 210 Ore. 243, 310 P.2d 328. On
June 2, 1950, the defendant in this case married John
L. Kelley in the State of \Vashington. At the time of the
marriage defendant and l{elley were residents of the
State of Oregon. On :Jiarch 18, 1949, the defendant's
previous husband obtained an interlocutory decree of
divorce fron1 her in the State of \Vashington. The defendant in this case on Septe1nber 8, 1950 obtained a final
decree of divoree in the \Vashington court. On August
1+, 195~. John 1\.:elley died in the State of Oregon. On
August ~9, 195:2, the defendant in this case obtained an
mnended final decree of divorce in the \Yashington court
12
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which amended decree ordered that the final decree of
divorce be entered nunc pro tunc as of September 19,
1949.
The defendant in September of 1952, was appointed
administratrix of her husband's estate. Prior to defendant's marriage with Kelley, he had made a will leaving
all of his property to his sons and he had neither changed
that will nor executed a new one after his marriage to the
defendant.
The plaintiffs in this action, children of Kelley, filed
a petition against the defendant for the removal of defendant as adminstratrix on the ground that she was not
the widow of the decedent. The trial court denied the
petition for the removal of the defendant as administratrix and entered an order determining that the heirs of
the decedent, John L. Kelley, were his widow, the
defendant, Ruth M. Kelley, and his two sons by a prior
marriage. From this order the plaintiffs appealed.
The principal question for determination was whether the entry on August 29, 1952, of a final decree of divorce between defendant and her prior husband by the
Washington court nunc pro tunc as of September 19,
1949, pursuant to the Washington statute validated the
marriage on June 2, 1950, of defendant and the decedent,
John L. Kelley. If the marriage was valid, it revoked the
will executed by the decedent prior to such marriage.

vVashington in 1949 enacted substantially the same
statute as had been enacted in California relative to
entering final decrees of divorce nunc pro tunc.

13

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

It was argued by the plaintiffs in this case that they
had acquired vested rights in their father's estate that
should not be disturbed by permitting the divorce decree
to be entered nunc pro tunc. The Oregon court said at
page 336.
"In our opinion, the interest acquired by the
plaintiffs in their father's estate upon his death
was not the kind of vested right protected from
the entry of a nunc pro tunc decree."
The Oregon Supreme Court affirmed the trial court
and held that the entry of the Washington divorce nunc
pro tunc had the effect of validating the marriage of the
defendant with the decedent, John Kelley. It also held
that it had the effect of revoking the will of the decedent.
For other cases announcing the same principles, see
Abramson vs. Abramson, App. D.C. 193; 49 F.2d 501 and
111 ock vs. Chaney, 36 Colo. 60, 87 P. 538.
For cases recognizing and upholding the power of
a court to enter a final decree of divorce nunc pro tunc
with out the aid of a statute such as that in effect in the
State of California and the State of Washington, see
Snodgras vs. Snodgras, 85 Ohio App. 285, 88 N.E.2d 616
(1948); Perdew vs. Perdew, 99 Colo. 5-1-±, 64 P.2d 602.
·The Utah Supre1ne Court in the case of Anderson
vs. Anderson, 121 U. 237, :2±0 P.:2d 966 in considering the
presu1nption of the validity of a second 1narriage said:
''The presumption of the Yalidity of a second
1narriage is one of the strongest disputable presumptions known in law. It is not to be broken

14

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

in upon or shaken by a mere balance of probability. The court held that the evidence to overcome
this presumption must be clear and convincing."
The validity of the marriage of Howard Cahoon and
Dorothy Cahoon is to be determined by Utah law. In
accordance with the authorities cited above the Utah law
refers us to the California law to determine what. the
legal effect of the California decree of divorce was. Under the California law, entering the final decree nunc pro
tunc had the effect of declaring that the status of Mrs.
Cahoon was that of a single person at the time she married Howard Cahoon. The effect of that was to validate
the marriage unless that by so doing it would be against
the public policy of the State of Utah. As shown by the
Anderson case cited above the policy of Utah law is to
validate a marriage where that is possible. It is also the
policy of Utah law to legitimate children and not to declare void a marriage and there by bastardize the children.
Under the facts of this case, there is no reason at all for
the Utah law not to give the same effect to the entry
of the California decree of divorce nunc pro tunc as it
is given under California law and thereby give full faith
and credit to the California decree.
Article IV Sec. 1 of the Constitution of the United
States provides "full faith and credit shall be given in
each state to the public acts, records and judicial proceedings of every other state. And the Congress may by
general laws prescribe the manner in which such acts,
records and proceedings shall be proved, and the effect
thereof." 28 U.S.C.A. 1738 provides in substance that the
judicial proceedings of a state shall have the same full

15
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faith and credit in every court within the United States
and its territories and possessions as they have by law
or usage in the courts of such state, territory, or possession from which they are taken.
We submit that under the cases cited above the marriage of Howard Cahoon and Dorothy Cahoon was valid.
POINT II
AN ACTION FOR CRIMINAL CONVERSATION IS RECOGNIZED UNDER NEVADA LAW AND UTAH LAW AND
PUNITIVE DAMAGES MAY BE RECOVERED IN SUCH
ACTION. (SEE DEFENDANT'S POINTS II AND III)

The Nevada Supreme Court recognized that the action of criminal conversation exists under Nevada law
in the case of Rehling vs. Brainard, 114 P. 167, 38 Nev.
16. The action of criminal conversation concededly has
not been abolished in the State of Nevada.
The defendant claims that when the common law v.-as
adopted in Utah by statute in 1898 that such adoption
meant the con1mon law as it existed in England as of
1898. When we adopted the cmmnon law in 1898, did we
Inean the common law as it existed in England as of that
time or did \Ye Inean the cormnon law which generally prevailed in this country as of 1898? Our Supreme Court has
held in the case of Hatch l'. Hatch, 46 F. 116, l±S P.
1096 (1915) that the connnon law that \Yas adopted in
Utah was the co1nmon law that generally prevailed in this
country and not necessaril~T as it existed in Great Britain.
The Utah Court said at page 1100,
16
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"Our conclusion, therefore, is that, while
Congress, by extending over the territory of Utah
the Constitution and Laws of the United States,
put in force, in the language of the Suprerne
Court of the United States, 'the system of common
law and equity which generally prevails in this
country', yet did not so extend or transplant the
common law of England, with all its rigor and
harshness, but only so much of it as was and had
been generally recognized and enforced in this
country, and as is and was suitable to our conditions. There is much to support the view that when
the colonists left Great Britain they brought with
them and adopted, so far as suitable to their new
conditions and surroundings, the usages and customs then prevailing in Great Britain. There is
no good reason, however, for saying that as to
those who migrated from the states and settled in
territory never under the British dominion."
The Utah Supreme Court in the Hatch case cited the
decision of the United States Supreme Court in the case
known as Mormon Church vs. United States, 136 U.S. 62,
10 S. Ct. 792, 34 L. Ed. 481, where the court said,
"But it is apparent from the language of the
Organic Act, which was passed September 9, 1850,
* * * that it was the intention of Congress that the
system of common law and equity which generally
prevails in this country should be operative in the
territory of Utah, except as it might be altered by
legislation. * * * In view of these significant provisions, we infer that the general system of common law and equity, as it prevails in this country,
is the basis of the law of Utah."
It should be noted that the Organic Act of 1850 declared that the Constitution and laws of the United State::;

17
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extended over the territory of Utah. The Matrimonial
Causes Act, that was adopted in England and upon which
the defendant relies, was not enacted until 1857. Since
the common law that was adopted in Utah was the common law that generally prevailed in this country it cannot
be claimed that the Matrimonial Causes Act adopted in
1857 in England could have effect in this state.
It is conceded by defendant that virtually all of the
States in the United States recognize the common law
action for criminal conversation. The only states that do
not recognize that action are the ones that have abolished
it by statute.
The following is said in the footnotes of 27 .Am. Jur.
Sec. 535, page 135,
"In England although the common law action
for criminal conversation was abolished by Section 59 of the Matrimonial Causes Act, yet by
Section 28 and 33 of that Act the husband may,
on a petition against the adulterer alone, or upon
joining him as correspondent in a petition against
his wife for dissolution of the n1arriage, reco-ver
damages assessed by a jury as in an action at law.
There is, in other words, no obligation of the
husband's right of action against the adulterer,
but only a change as to the fonn of remedy. It
also leaves unaffected his cause of action for enticing his wife to abandon him, or to recover for
loss of consortiun1 when caused by physical injury
to her person. Nolin vs. Pierson. 191 ~Iass, 283,
77 N. E. 890."

uBurnstein vs. Burnste·i·n, (1893) 12 Eng. Rul,
Cas. 783, held that claims for damages against the
correspondent in a divorce proceeding under the

18
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Matrimonial Causes Act are to be tried on the
same principles and in the same manner as common law actions for criminal conversation."
The Utah Supreme Court has held in several cases,
Wilson v. Oldroyd, 267 P.2d 759, 1 U.2d 362, 8adleir v.
Knapton, 296 P.2d 278, 5 U.2d 33, that an action for
alienation of affections is recognized in Utah. It certainly,
therefore, would not be against the public policy of the
State of Utah to recognize an action for criminal conversation. Many states, that have abolished by statute the
action for alienation of affections have retained and refused to abolish the action for criminal conversation.
Among such states are Pennsylvania and Nevada. The
policy favoring the action of criminal conversation is well
stated in 27 Am. Jur, Sec. 535, page 135, where it is
stated,
"A fundamental right which flows from the
relation of marriage, and one which the well being
of society requires shall be maintained inviolate,
is that of one spouse to have exclusive marital
intercourse with the other, and whenever a third
person commits adultery with either spouse, he or
she commits a tortious invasion of the rights of
the other spouse, from which a cause of action for
criminal conversation arises.
The legislature by enacting Section 78-7-4, U.C.A., 1953,
has recognized that the action for criminal conversation
does exist in the State of Utah. That statute provides,
"In an action of divorce, criminal conversation, seduction, abortion, rape or assault with intent to commit rape, the court may, in its discretion, exclude all persons who are not directly
19
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interested therein, except jurors, witnesses and
officers of the courts; and in any cause the court
may in its discretion during the examination of
the witness exclude any and all other witnesses
in the case."
See the discussion of the term "criminal conversation" as used in this statute in State v. Beckstead, 96 U.
528, 88 p. 2d 461.
We think that our discussion regarding defendant's
claim that the action of criminal conversation does not
exist in the State of Utah pretty much disposes of the
defendant's claim that punitive damages are not recoverable in Utah in an action for criminal conversation. If the
action is recognized in Utah, as we think it definitely is,
and if punitive damages are recoverable in an action
for alienation of affections as they definitel:- are, Wilson
v. Oldroyd, supra, we can see no good reason why puni-

tive damages should not be recoverable in an action for
criminal conversation. Most states pernrit the recovery
of punitive dan1ages in an action for crnninal conversation, 27 Am. Jur., Sec. 5±6, page 146. 31

~\_.L.R.

2d 725

states the rule as follows:
"It has generally been held in this country
that punitive or exeinplary da1nages are recoverable in an action for crnninal conversation."
27 Am. J ur., Sec. 55:2, page 153, states, "The law
presumes malice fr01n crilninal conversation, in an action
therefor."
20
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POINT III
'THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN GRANTING A NEW
TRIAL ON THE FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION.
A.

PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL WAS
TIMELY.

Judgment was entered after the first trial by the
clerk in favor of the plaintiff for the sum of $25,000
(R. 70). The court in its memorandum decision, dated
May 20, 1958, ordered a remititur or a new trial (R. 74,
75). Plaintiff refused to remit and the court on June
3, 1958, entered its order granting defendant a new trial.
An examination of the judgment on the verdict dated
April 17, 1958, shows that a judgment of no cause of
action was not entered on the first cause of action for
alienation of affections. On September 5, 1958, plaintiff,
upon discovering that such a judgment had not been
entered on the first cause of action, prepared such a
judgment and with the approval of the court had it signed
by the clerk. Immediately following the signing and the
filing of that judgment, plaintiff filed a motion for a
new trial on the cause of action for alienation of affections. That motion was argued on September 9, 1958,
and an order granting a new trial on the first cause of
action was entered on September 11, 1958. (R. 81). The
Utah Supreme Court has considered two cases involving a "judgment on verdict" that was exactly the same
as the April 17, 1958, judgment that was entered in this
case. Those cases are K ourbetis v. National Copper Bank,
264 P. 724, 71 U. 232 and Ellinwood v. Bennion, 276 P.
159, 73 U. 563. The judgments in the two cases cited
contained recitals of the jury verdict, but when they
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got to the "wherefore clause'' of the judgment or the
''decretal'' part they did not order adjudge and decree
and settle the rights between the parties. The court in
both the Kourbetis and Ellinwood case held the judglnents were not final judgments from which an appeal
would lie. 49 C.J.S., Sec. 71, page 190, states the rule
as follows,
"While under code practice a recital of facts
in a equitable decree is usual and proper, only
the decretal part of the decree determines the
rights of the parties and constitutes the final
judgment in the case."
There having been no final judgment entered on April
17, 1958, and none having been entered until September
5, 1958, plaintiff's motion for new trial on the first cause
of action for alienation of affections having been filed
on September 5, 1958, immediately following the entry
of the judgment was timely. See Rule 54(a) and 59(b)
URCP.
B.

THE EFFECT OF THE ·COURTS ORDER GRANTING
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL WAS TO
GRANT A NEW TRIAL ON BOTH CAUSES OF ACTION.

In any event the effect of the order of the trial court
contained in its me1norandun1 decision of ~lay 20, 1958,
and the order dated June 3, 1958, granting the new trial
was to grant a new trial as to the entire case. See 66
C.J.S., Sec. 210, page 541 where the rule is stated:
"An order for a new trial in general tenns,
not expressly lilnited to particular issues or
parties, opens up the whole case for further pro22
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ceedings, even though the ground on which the
new trial is based affects a part of the issues
only, provided the order for the new trial does
not restrict it to those issues and the presumption
is against such restrictions."
See Cramer v. Bock, 21 Wash. 2d 13, 149 P. 2d 525,
where the court cites 3 Am. Jur., Appeal and Error, Sec.
1228 as follows,
"The right to limit the issues when ordering
a new trial should be exercised only when it is
clear that no injustice will result from so doing.
As much more of the case must be retried as
may be necessary in order to afford the parties a
fair trial. Generally, it may be said before a
partial new trial may properly be granted, it
should clearly appear that the issue to be retried
is so distinct and separable from the others that
a trial of it alone may be had without injustice
and without danger of complication with other
matters."
In 66 C.J.S., Sec. 11, page 99, the rule is stated,
"Where there are distinct counts or causes
of action and separate findings, there may be a
new trial as to a part only of such counts or
causes, where this can be done without danger of
confusion or prejudice. On the other hand, where
the two causes of action stated in the complaint
arose out of the same transaction, it is within
the discretion of the trial court to grant a new
trial on the whole issue * * * and a new trial as
to all issues has been required where the verdicts
on the several causes of action are inconsistent
with one another and the evidence in support
of all the causes is substantially similar.
23
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C.

THE EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO SHOW THAT
MRS. CAHOON'S AFFECTIONS WERE ALIENATED
OUTSIDE THE ST~TE OF NEVADA.

In so far as the activities of Mr. Pelton and Mrs.
Cahoon in the State of Utah are concerned, the evidence
shows the following. Mrs. Cahoon was in Salt Lake for
three or four weeks in June or July, 1955, (R. 363, 472).
Mrs. Cahoon was here in Salt Lake for one week during
Christmas 1955 and was here for three or four weeks in
June or July of 1956 which was just a month before
plaintiff learned of the relationship between defendant
and plaintiff's wife. (R. 363, 472, 473). Defendant went
horseback riding with Mrs. Cahoon in Evanston, Wyoming, kissed her while she was here in the summer of
1955 and 1956. (R. 341, 342, 357, 592). Defendant took her
to the Variety Club in Salt Lake in the summer of 1956
where he was observed with his arms around her, kissing
her and having drinks with her. (R. 246, 561). Defendant wrote letters fron1 Salt Lake addressed to !:Irs.
Cahoon, sent her a bathing suit for her birthday, a valentine card and called her on the telephone from Salt Lake.
(R. 334-337, 588). Defendant refused to testify and
claimed his privilege against self-incrimination when
asked "\vhether or not he had had sexual intercourse \\'i.th
Mrs. Cahoon while she was in Salt Lake in the summer
of 1955, in December of 1955 and in the summer of 1956.
(R. 3-l-2-34-l, 594). The evidence shows that the last time
defendant and !:Irs. Cahoon saw each other prior to the
tilne Mrs. Cahoon and the plaintiff separated was while
Mrs. Cahoon was here in the smnn1er of 1956. 'ye submit
that under the circun1stances of this case there is ample
24
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evidence from which the jury could find that the acts
that occurred outside the State of Nevada were a substantial factor in alienating the affections of plaintiff's
wife.
POINT IV
IT WAS NOT ERROR TO GIVE INSTRUCTION NO. 11.
(R. 124-125).

Defendant's exceptions to Instruction No. 11 are
contained on pages 707 and 708 of the record. Defendant
did not take exception to the instruction on any ground
that is now raised by defendant in his Point No. V as
being prejudicial error. Having failed to properly except
to the instruction, the defendant cannot now claim it is
erroneous. Furthermore an examination of instruction
No. 11 as a whole shows the jury could not have been
misled by it.
POINT V
PLAINTIFF IS NOT BARRED FROM BRINGING 'THE
_AiCTIONS IN QUESTION BE;CAUSE OF THE FACT THAT
PLAINTIFF'S WIFE OBTAINED THE DIVORCE.

Defendant claims that plaintiff is barred from bringing the actions in question because of the fact that plaintiff's wife obtained the divorce.
Defendant recognizes that the court in the case of
Sadlier v. Knapton, 5 U. 2d 33, P. 2d 278, has held
specifically that the fact that the wife obtains the divorce
does not preclude the husband from maintaining an action
against a third party for alienation of affections. That
case is the law of this State.

25
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POINT VI
PLAINTIFF WAS ENTITLED TO RECOVER DAMAGES
FOR FUTURE OR PERMANENT LOSS OF HIS WIFE'S
SERVICES, AFFECTION, CONSORTIUM AND SOCIETY.
(SEE DEFENDANT'S POINT VII)

Defendant claims that plaintiff could only recover
for loss of services, affection, consortium, companionship
and society of his wife down to the time of the divorce.
It should be noted that the -cases cited by defendant
in support of that argument are extremely old cases.
The court in the case of Wilson v. Oldroyd, supra,
has decided this point and in so doing used the following
language,
"No one will gainsay that the task of placing
a monetary value upon the affections of a v~ife
is fraught with grave difficulty. The valuation
is of course not on a strictly out of pocket basis
and cannot be computed solely from contributions
of money to be expected, nor the value of domestic
services alone. There are other intangible but
definite values in the comfort and society, love
and con1panionship, and other privileges attendant upon the estate of marriage for which compensation can be awarded, not only up to the time of
divorce, but for permanent loss of such conjugal
rights."
The Utah Court cites Restate1nent of Torts, Sec.
910, page 559 and Riggs v. Sm,iJth, 52 Idaho 43, 11 P. 2d
358 in support of that holding. The Idaho case states
the rule as follows,
"The plaintiff is not linrited to a recovery
of dmnages measured by the loss of consortimu

26

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

down to the date of the commencement of the
action, but is entitled to damages measured by
the permanent loss of the spouse's aid, comfort
and companionship."
See also Genness v. Simpson, 78 A. 886, 84 Vt. 127;
Bryant v. Carrier, 198 S.E. 619, 214 N.C. 191; 42 C.J.S.,
Sec. 706, page 361.
POINT VII
rT WAS NOT ERROR FOR THE COURT TO INSTRUCT
THE JURY ON THE LIFE EXPECT ANGY TABLE NOR TO
PERMIT COUNSEL TO ARGUE THE SAME TO THE JURY.

The defendant cites Johnson v. Richards, 50 Idaho
150, 294 P. 507, as authority for the argument that the
mortality tables are inadmissible. The court in the case
of Fife v. Adair, 47 P. 2d 145, 173 Okl. 234, in an action
by a wife for the alienation of her husband's affections
had occasion to consider the same question and in so
doing discussed the Idaho case. After quoting that part
of the Idaho case which is quoted verbatim in defendant's brief, page 45, the Oklahoma Court said,
"To follow this case would be to hold that
the tables are not admissible in any kind of action
for the loss of support. The court in the Johnson
case says that to so hold would base a presumption upon a presumption. That is, that the marital
relation once shown would continue to exist until
death and that the love and affection would likewise continue until the death of one of them. This
court has held in a number of cases that in an
action for damages for the loss of support on
account of personal injury the American Mortality Tables are competent evidence for the con-
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sideration of the jury along with the other evidence for what ever probative value they may
have. City of Shawnee et al. v. Slankard, 29 Okl.
page 133, 116 P. 803, syllabus : 'The expectation
of life of one injured by another's negligence may
be shown as a basis for the estimation of damages
in a case where the evidence tends to show the
injury is permanent, and standard tables of mortality are admissible in evidence upon this
question.'
"The loss of support is an element of damage
in this case. 'To hold that the American Tables of
Mortality are not admissible for the reason that
it would base a presumption upon a presumption
would overrule and set aside every case by this
court wherein it has been held that such tables
are admissible to prove expectation of life where
loss of support was an element of damages. In
a personal injury case, it would be contended
with equal force that you would first have to
presume marital relation would continue until
death, and the further presumption of continuation of support. Adair was not a "\\itness in this
case ; in determining the question of the amount
plaintiff would be entitled to recover for the loss
of the support of her husband, certainly the jury
would be entitled to know son1ething as to his
age and condition of health. A larger sum should
be allowed for the loss of a husband who is young
and vigorous than an older one whose earning
capacity- would not be as great on account of his
age and condition of health. These tables are not
admitted in evidence as absolute guides to control
the decision of the jury, but for whatever w-eight
the jury 1uay give the1n along ''ith the other
evidence in the case."
The Utah Supren1e Court has held in a number of
cases that the 1nortality tables are ad1nissible. See Ben28
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nett v. The Denver and Rio Grande Western Railroad
Company7 213 P. 2d 325, 117 U. 57; Shields v. Utah Light
Traction Co. 7 99 U. 307, 105 P. 2d 327; Schlatter v.
McCarthy 7 113 U. 543, 196 P. 2d 968.
In view of the ruling by the Idaho Court in the
later case of Riggs v. Sm.ith7 supra, to the effect that
permanent loss of services are recoverable in an alienation of affections action, it is doubtful that the Idaho
Court would follow the Johnson case again.

It has not been followed by any other court and
has been rejected by the Oklahoma court.
The holding of the Johnson case to the effect that
the mortality tables are inadmissible because it permits
a presumption to be based upon a presumption is plainly
wrong. As pointed out by the Oklahoma Supreme Court,
exactly the same argument could be made to the admissibility of the tables in a wrongful death or personal injury
action. As noted, Utah in a long line of decisions, has
admitted the tables in wrongful death and personal injury
actions.
As to defendant's claim that it was improper for
plaintiff's counsel to argue the mortality tables to the
jury, it should be noted first of all that during the
argument defendant did not object to plaintiff's argument concerning the mortality tables. The only objection
that was made was after the argument had been completed. Defendant did except, (R. 713, 714) to such argument by plaintiff, but did not object during the course
of it. The cases cited by defendant to the effect that
29
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such an argument may not be made are cases dealing
with an argument concerning damages for pain, suffering
and so forth on a per diem basis. Those cases have
nothing to do with an argument involving the damages for
loss of services.

Wilson v. Oldroyd) supra, holds that the husband, in
an alienation of affections actions, may recover for
permanent loss of services of his wife. There is no difference in permitting use of the mortality tables as an aid
to the jury in estimating damages for loss of services
in an alienation of affections action and a personal injury
or death action. That such tables may be used under
Utah law, see: Mitchell v. Arrowhead Freight Lines) Ltd.,
214 P. 2d 620, 117 TJ. 224.
POINT VIII
IF THE .COS'T OF SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S WIFE
IS AN OFFSET AT ALL, IT MAY ONLY BE OFFSET AGAINST THE $2,500 THAT WAS AWARDED ON THE CAUSE
OF ACTION FOR ALIENATION OF AFFECTIONS.

The trial court offset the cost of support against
only the $2,500 awarded for alienation of affections on
the theor~r that the value of the duty to support could
be best offset onl~~ against the value of lost services,
and that, loss of services ,,~as. by the instruction, an
element of damages in the cause of action for alienation
of affections, but not an element of dan1ages in the case
of criminal conversation.
Instruction No. 12 (R. 126) states the measure of
da~nages for criminal conversation and it should be noted
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from that instruction that the jury was permitted to take
into account only the shame and ridicule which the husband would be subjected to and the mental anguish and
distress which he would necessarily suffer by reason
of said illicit conduct on the part of the one who had
relations with his wife. Instruction No. 13 which pertains
to alienation of affections specifically states that in
fixing the amount of plaintiff's damages for that cause
of action the jury may take into account loss of companionship, aid, society and services of the wife. Defendant
did not take exception in any way to the court's Instruction No. 12 which pertains to the measure of damage
for criminal conversation. (R. 707-710). It should also be
noted that defendant took the position at trial that the
value of the husband's duty to support would be deductible from the value of the lost services. On page 708 of
the record the defendant's counsel took exception to
Instruction No. 13 and in so doing said,
"On the ground that the instruction does not
charge the jury that they must take into account
in determining the value of lost services, if any,
the value of the husband's duty to support. It is
defendant's contention that the law is that the
measure of damages is the value of the lost
services less the value of the husband's duty to
support."
If there was any error in the court refusing to permit
the jury to consider loss of services in arriving at its
award of damages for criminal conversation, that error
has been waived by defendant's failure to take exception
to Instrument No. 12 and furthermore that error was an
error in favor of the defendant of which he may not
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now complain. If anyone was prejudiced by not permitting the jury to consider loss of services on the cause
of action for criminal conversation, it was the plaintiff,
not the defendant.
The defendant claims that it was the intention of
the jury that the amount of $17,000 support should be
deducted from the entire verdict. During plaintiff's argument to the jury it was mentioned by plaintiff's counsel
that the court wanted the jury to find the amount of the
support and that it would be deducted from the award
that was made. The court interrupted counsel for the
plaintiff and stated that it did not know whether the
cost of support would be deducted or not but that that
would be a matter of law to be determined at a later
date. The court told the jury that all he wanted it to do
was to find the amount. (R. 714, 715).
For the defendant to now claim that the cost of
support should be deducted from anything other than
the award on the cause of action where th~ value of
services was taken into account as an element of damage
is as inconsistent as it is to now argue that the jury
was in fact permitted to consider loss of sernces as an
element of da1nage under Instruction X o. 1~ on the cause
of action for criminal conversation.
The case of Prettyman r. Tri1li~amson. 39 A. 731
(Dela.) which has been cited at great length by defendant
also states in substance that the Yalue of a wife ·s services
is to be reduced h)~ the value of the performance of the
husband's dnt)r to support, cloth and care for her.
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The cost of support of plaintiff's wife should not
be an offset at all. The $2,500 that was awarded on
the cause of action for alienation of affections should be
reinstated and in any event if the cost of support is
held to be deductible it should only be offset against
the $2,500 awarded on the cause of action where loss
of services were taken into acount. The cases cited by
defendant, Rash v. Pratt, 111 A. 225; Allen v. Rossi,
146 A. 692, so hold.
POINT IX
THE COURT CORRECTLY PERMITTED PLAINTIFF TO
READ DEPOSITIONS OF WITNESSES IN WHICH 'THE
WITNESSES CLAIMED THEIR P R IV I L E G E AGAINST
SELF-INCRIMINATION. (SEE DEFENDANT'S POINT X
AND XI)

During the first trial a conference took place in
the judge's chambers resulting, after request of the defendant, in the plaintiff not being permitted to require
the defendant to claim his privilege against self-incrimination while on the witness stand. (R. 320-330). Pursuant
to direction of the trial court in chambers, it was understood if the defendant wanted to claim his privilege
against self-incrimination that all that was necessary
was for defendant's counsel to say in substance, "I object
on the grounds previously stated" and that would let
the court know that the defendant was claiming his
privilege. The defendant does not complain of what took
place at the first trial as well he cannot, with respect
to the matter of the defendant claiming his privilege
against self-incrimination. We believe the trial court
was in error in not permitting plaintiff at the first trial
33
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to ask the defendant questions on the stand and compel
him to claim his privilege in so many words in the presence of the jury. However that was error that operated
to the benefit of the defendant. We point it out only
for the purpose of showing what occurred at the first
trial as distinguished from what took place at the second
trial. The defendant failed to appear at all at the second
trial, and it was necessary for plaintiff to read the testimony of the defendant as it was given at the first trial.
In addition to reading that testimony plaintiff read
certain parts of defendant's deposition where the defendant claimed his privilege against self-incrimination.
It is not only proper to require a party to claim his
privilege before the jury but in addition to that an inference may be drawn, from the fact that a party refuses
to testify on the ground of privilege, adverse to the party
so refusing. Many cases have been decided so holding.
In Re Vaughan, 189 Cal. 491, 209 P. 353, Fish v. State
Bar of Californi'a, 214 Cal. 215, 4 P. 2d 937, and In Re
Fenn, 235 Mo. App. 24, 128 S.\Y. 2d 657, were cases
involving disbarment proceedings against an attorney.
The court in those cases held that a disbarment proceeding was not a criminal proceeding but '\Yas a special
proceeding of a civil nature. Each court held that the
constitutional privilege against self-incrimination did
not extend to protect the attorney from being called as
a witness. It was also held that while the attorney could
be called as a witness and could be asked questions, he
would be pennitted to refuse to answer the questions on
the ground that his testinwny would tend to incriminate
34
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him, but if he failed to testify an inference adverse to
him could be drawn.
There are many other cases holding that when a
party to a civil action claims his privilege an adverse
inference may be drawn therefrom. See Fross v. Wotton,
3 Cal. 2d 384,44 P. 2d 350; Stillman Pond, Inc. v. Watson,
115 Cal. App. 2d 440, 252 P. 2d 717; Ikeda v. Curtis, 43
Wash. 2d 449, 261 P. 2d 684.
The Stillman Pond case and the Fross case, both
from California, are discussed in the Washington case.
The Supreme Court of Washington in the Ikeda case
in holding that an inference may be drawn against a party
who claims the privilege against self-incrimination in a
civil action, had the following to say,
"The purpose of the privilege against selfincrimination is to protect the witness from compulsory disclosure of criminal liability. When a
witness in a civil suit refuses to answer a question
on the ground that his answer might tend to
incriminate him, the result sought to be achieved
by invoking the constitutional privilege is accomplished. Such refusal cannot be used against
him in a subsequent criminal proceeding. However, the trier of facts in a civil case is entitled
to draw an inference from his refusal to so testify.
Fross v. Wotton, 3 Cal. 2d 384, 44 P. 2d 350, 354,
was a fraud case. The defendant claimed the
privilege against self-incrimination, and refused
to answer certain questions. The court, in ruling
upon the question of whether or not an inference
could be drawn from such refusal, said: 'We are
here met by the argument that it is a violation of
the constitutional privilege to draw an inference
from the refusal to testify when put upon the
35
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ground of the privilege against self-incrimination.
However, we do not think the inference here drawn
constitutes a denial or invasion of that privilege.

* * * * * * * * * *
" '* * * The privilege is not for the benefit of
the guilty nor to enable the claimant to prevail
in civil suits by means of it. The privilege is to
be protected from compulsory disclosure of criminal liability or facts connecting the claimant with
the crime. See In Re Berman, 105 Cal. App. 37,
287 P. (125) 126. 'To hold that no inference could
be drawn from the refusal of these witnesses to
explain their dealings, in the face of so many
suspicious circumstances, would be an unjustifiable extension of the privilege for a purpose it
was never intended to fulfill.'

"Stillman Pond, Inc. v. \Yatson, 115 Cal. App.
2d 440, 252 P. 2d 717, 718, was an action for a
writ of mandate to compel the real estate commission to vacate an order revoking a real estate
broker's license. In an appeal from an order revoking the license the court said:
"'When Pond, as a "itness on cross-examination, was asked w·hat he did with the money he
received as a deposit on the sale of the Rites,
lot, he refused to ans·wer on the ground that
answering the question would tend to incriminate
him. One of the issues was whether Pond commingled the deposit nwney with his money. The
question which he refused to answer related directly to that issue. An inference could be drawn
fron1 his refusal to answer said question that he
did not in1n1ediately place the deposit n10ney in
a neutral escrow depository or in the hands of
principals or Inaintain a trust fund account ·with
a bank or a recognized depository. See Fross Y.
\V otton, 3 Cal. ~d 384, 395, 44 P. 2d 350.'
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"See also McCoo vs. Dighton, S. & S. Street
Railway Co., 173 Mass. 117, 53 N.E. 134, wherein
the court said :

"'* * * In a civil case, if one of the parties
insists upon his privilege to exclude testimony
that would throw light upon the merits of the case
and the truth of the testimony, we are of opinion
that it is a proper subject for comment. Andrews
vs. Frye, 104 Mass. 234, 236. See Commonwealth
vs. Smith, 163 ::Mass. 411, 430 et seq., 40 N.E. 189.
This being so, it was proper for the court to compel the plaintiff to take the full responsibility of
the choice.'
"Appellant's refusal to testify, taken alone,
would not justify a finding that prostitution was
practiced in the hotel from which she received a
monetary benefit. However, an inference may be
drawn from her refusal to so testify, which may
be coupled with, and considered with, proper and
relevent evidence to prove such fact."
See the excellent discussion of ''Consequences of
Exercising the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination" in
Volume 24 Chicago Law Review, page 472. At page 477
the rule is stated as follows:
"Therefore, if evidence is introduced in a civil
action tending to indicate that one of the parties
has been guilty of a criminal act, and that party,
by exercising his self-incrimination privilege as a
witness, refuses to refute or deny such evidence,
the court or jury may infer that the adverse evidence and its implications are true, but it is the
failure to contradict the adverse evidence, not the
exercise of the privilege, that produces the inference."
37
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Defendant claims it was error for plaintiff to read
the deposition of Mrs. Cahoon. Defendant as part of his
defense read a substantial part from Mrs. Cahoon's deposition as is shown by the record beginning at page 624.
Plaintiff read the deposition of Mrs. Cahoon where she
claimed the privilege against self-incrimrnation beginning
at page 644 of the record to page 648. Defendant did not
object to the reading of Mrs. Cahoon's deposition. (R.
644). Likewise defendant did not make a motion to strike
such testimony nor did defendant request an instruction
to the effect that no adverse inference could be drawn
against the defendant from the fact that Mrs. Cahoon
claimed her privilege against self-incrimination or that
she refused to ans·wer certain questions. (R. 92-115). For
these reasons alone the testimony read from the deposition of Mrs. Cahoon cannot be prejudicial error.
The cases cited by defendant in support of the claim
that it was improper to read from the deposition of Mrs.
Cahoon where the privilege was claimed, are distinguishable. The Masterson case, the Barnhart case and the Frye
case cited by defendant were all cases where the witness
was asked if he had clain1ed his prh'ilege against selfincrimination at a prior tilne, the sole purpose being to
impeach the ·witness. In the case no,,- before this court
that was not done. The only thing that was done was to
read the deposition of the witness. which plaintiff had a
right to do, inas1nuch as the witness was not present at
trial and was not within the State of lTtah, Rule 26 (d) (3)
URCP. The defendant on page 53 of his brief concedes
that plaintiff has the right to question a witness on the
witness stand about 1natters which 1nay result in a claim
38
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of privilege. That we are sure is correct. If the defendant
or Mrs. Cahoon had been there, we certainly could have
put both of them on the stand and could have asked them
questions that would have resulted in the claim of privilege before the jury. Inasmuch as they were not there, we
exercised our right to use their deposition at the trial.
Morris vs. McClella;n, 154 Ala. 639, 45 S. 641 (1908) is a
case directly in point. That was an action to recover damages for assault and battery. In this case the plaintiff
served interrogatories upon the defendant. Some of the
questions were answered by the defendant and others he
refused to answer on the ground that to answer them
might incriminate him. At the trial of the case plaintiff
read the interrogatories together with the answers to
certain questions and the refusal to answer others to the
jury. The defendant's refusal to answer certain questions
was the subject of comment in argument by counsel to the
jury. The court said,
"'The question is now presented whether it
was permissible for the plaintiff, over the defendant's objection to read to the jury those interrogatories which the defendant refused to answer,
and the defendant's ground of refusal, and to comment on the same in argument. In criminal prosecution the failure or refusal of the defendant
to testify cannot be commented on in argument;
but we know of no authority applying this rule
to civil actions, nor do we see any reason for so
doing. The plaintiff in a civil action has rights,
as well as the defendant; and one of these rights
is to secure evidence to support his cause in court,
even to calling upon the defendant as a witness to
supply it. It has always been the rule in civil actions that the failure of a party to the suit, when
39
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present at the trial, to testify as to a fact in issue,
furnished legitimate ground of comment in argu~
ment to the jury by the opposite party. The defendant availed himself of his constitutional right
of refusal to answer on the grounds stated, and he
had his benefit and protection from prosecution
in exercising his privilege; but he could not expect
to extend this privilege to the deprivation of the
plaintiff of his right to comment in argument on
his silence, no matter upon what ground he might
put it. We are of the opinion that the trial court
committed no error in its rulings on this question."
Morgan vs. Kendall, 24 N.E.143, 124 Ind. 454 (1890).
In this case the court held that where in a civil action for
assault and battery, the plaintiff calls the defendant as
a witness, and asks him whether he committed the battery
complained of, and defendant refuses to answer on the
ground that his answer might tend to incriminate hiin,
such refusal is a proper matter to be considered by the
jury in connection with plaintiff's own testimony that
defendant committed the battery.

The court also held that this did not cmnpel the witness to give evidence against hilnself and in so doing the
court said,
"Nor does this holding Yiolate the well known
rule that a party in a criminal case shall not be
compelled to furnish eYidenc.e against hilnself: for
as we have seen, when prosecuted c.rin1inally, his
conduct in refusing to testif~~ in the civil case cannot be given in eYidence against hiln."
See also United States

e~r

rel Zapp v. Dist1·ict Direc.-

tor of Imm1~rpration, 1:20 Fed.2d 7G2 (Second Circuit 1941).

40

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Even if it is assumed that it might have been error,
which we vigorously deny, to have read Mrs. Cahoon's
testimony where she claimed the privilege, it still was not
prejudicial. Mrs. Cahoon was the person with whom the
defendant was charged with having had illicit sexual
intercourse. The defendant had already claimed his privilege and refused to answer as to such intercourse, and as
seen from the cases cited above an inference adverse to
him could be drawn from the claiming of such privilege
or from his refusal to testify. The evidence as to the
adultery was overwhelming; admissions by both defendant and Mrs. Cahoon of being together and of kissing,
.evidence that they were alone, testimony of Richard
Cahoon that defendant admitted the adultery, plus the
adverse inference that could be drawn form defendant's
refusal to testify based upon his claiming the privilege.
The fact that Mrs. Cahoon also claimed the privilege adds
little to the evidence of adultery. Stated differently would
the result have been different as to the jury finding
adultery if the questions had not been read where Mrs.
Cahoon claimed her privilege. At the first trial the questions complained of now were not read (R. 415-422). The
jury found adultery.
POINT X
THE COURTS REFUSAL TO GIVE DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 20 WAS NOT PREJUDICIAL.

Defendant claims it was error for the court not to
specifically instruct the jury that the fact that plaintiff's
wife may have gone out with other men could have been
considered in mitigation of damages. Such an instruction
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was given to the jury at the first trial (Instruction No. 9,
R. 50). At the second trial the court in giving its Instruction No. 11 in substance covered the matters c~ntained in
defendant's requested Instruction No. 20. The court instructed the jury as follows,
"Therefore, before you can find that the defendant was guilty of alienation of the affections
of the wife of Howard B. Cahoon, you must find
from a preponderance of the evidence that the
following are true:
a. That Dorothy Cahoon had affection for
Howard B. Cahoon.
b. That the conduct of Robert P. Pelton
was intentional and was likely to induce Dorothy
W. Cahoon to lose her affection for Howard B.
Cahoon.
c. That Dorothy W. Cahoon did lose her
love and affection for Howard B. Cahoon.
b. That the conduct of Robert P. Pelton
was the controlling cause ·which induced Dorothy
W. Cahoon to lose son1e or all of her love and
affection for Howard B. Cahoon and that without
such conduct she would not have lost any of her
affection and loYe for the said Howard B. Cahoon.
If you believe and find from a preponderance
of the evidence that there was affection between
plaintiff and his wife. whether it was great or
small, and that defendant intentionally interferred
with, lessened, or destro~~ed such affection or interferred with, lessened or destroYed anY chance
of plaintiff and his wife oYerco~ing a~y difficulties that Pxisted bet"~een them (if you find any
such diffirnlties did exist), then you must find
that the defendant did alienate the affections of
42
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Dorothy W. Cahoon from her husband, Howard
B. ·Cahoon."
In Instruction No. 13 the court instructed the jury
as follows,
"You are instructed that one who has lost the
love and affection of his wife because of intentional conduct on the part of another man is entitled
to recover such a sum of money as will fairly and
reasonably compensate him for any loss of the
companionship, aid, society and services of his
wife which he has suffered and is reasonably
certain to suffer in the future as a proximate result of the conduct of the other person.
The above instructions point out quite clearly that
defendant is only liable for the damages that his own
conduct has caused. This of necessity excludes any liability for loss of affection, companionship or anything else
that may have been occasioned by Mrs. Cahoon going
out with men other than the defendant. The instructions
taken as a whole cover defendant's requested Instruction
No. 20.
·As will be observed from the record a good deal of
the trial was taken up by defendant laboring the point
that plaintiff's wife had gone out with other men. Defendant's final argument to the jury also stressed that fact
at great length.

The jury could very well have found that Mrs.
Cahoon did not go out with other men. See testimony of
plaintiff's daughter, Sylvia (R. 515) and of Mrs. Cahoon's
sister, Evelyn Fisher (R. 697). A careful reading of Rox43
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anne's testimony (R. 281-291, 528) raises substantial
doubt as to the accuracy of her observations.
It should be kept in mind that many things may be
considered by a jury in actions such as are now before
the court, in mitigation of damages. The defendant took
every advantage of every mitigating circumstance, such
as the claimed misconduct of the plaintiff toward Virginia Holt, plaintiff's wife's sister (R. 398, 670), the
claim that plaintiff did not show affection to his wife
and did not have sexual intercourse with her as often as
he should. (R. 191-203), evidence that plaintiff punched
his wife in the nose (R. 198, 497), and the claim that
plaintiff denied paternity of his son (R. 201, 616-623).
These factors, among others, defendant dwelled on at
length all during the trial in addition to mentioning at
every possible place the claim that plaintiff's wife was
going out with other men. All of them could be and were
considered by the jury in determining whether or not
there was affection between plaintiff and his wife and
all of them could be and were considered by the jury on
the question of damages. \Ve subn1it that it was not necessary for the court to go through and itemize all of the
various factors that the jury might consider in determining whether affection existed and in determining the
amount of damage that was caused by defendant's conduct. The instructions given correctly state the law and
there was no error in refusing to single out and instruct
on one of various factors that the jury could consider
in computing damages.
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POINT XI
THE GIVING OF- INSTRUCTION NO. 13 WAS NOT PREJUDICIAL ERROR.

Defendant claims that it was improper to permit the
jury to fix the value of the services, aid and society of
the plaintiff's wife without any evidence as to that value.
Schwartz vs. Premium Products, 221 P.2d 334, 98 Cal.
App.2d 780, holds that in an action for the value of the
mother's services it was not necessary to put in any evidence. The court in so holding said,
"Appellants argue that there is no evidence
as to the value of the mother's services. There need
not be. The jury may draw on its own knowledge
of the value of services of that character."
We submit that the jury is in an excellent position
to determine the value of services, aid, comfort, society
and companionship of a wife. The Utah Supreme Court
felt the same way in Wilson v. Oldroyd, supra, when it
used the following language.
"The question of damages in such instance
seems best addressed to the discretion of a jury;
they have homes, spouses and children of their
own, are experienced in practical affairs of daily
life and have different points of view; and they
are afforded the benefit of seeing and hearing the
witnesses. Because of their advantaged position
courts are extremely reluctant to interfere with
their verdicts.''
Defendant's exceptions to Instruction No. 13 appear
on pages 708 and 709 of the reeord. Defendant did not
except to that instruction upon any of the grounds that
are now claimed as error in defendant's Point XIV.
45
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POINT XII
THERE WAS NO ERROR IN REFUSING TO GRANT A
NEW TRIAL ON GROUND THAT THE VERDlCT WAS EXCESSIVE.

A full and complete answer to defendant's claim that
the verdict was excessive, without detailing all the evidence, lies in the fact that two juries have passed on the
question of damages.

CROSS-APPEAL
STATEMENT OF POINTS ON CROSS APPEAL
POINT A
THE TRIAL COURT COMMI'TED ERROR AS A MATTER
OF LAW AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN VACATING
THE JURY'S AWARD OF $12,000 PUNITIVE DAMAGES
AND SUBSTITUTING $1,000 THEREFOR. AS A MATTER OF
LAW THE JURY'S AWARD OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES
SHOULD BE REINSTATED.
POINT B
COST OF SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S WIFE IS NOT
DEDUCTIBLE AT ALL.
POINT C
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN GRANTING A
NEW TRIAL AT THE <CLOSE OF THE FIRST TRIAL OF
THIS ACTION.

The jun~ in the seeond trial returned a verdict of
$2,500 for alienation of affections, $25,000 for criminal
conversation and $12,000 punitive damages. The jury
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also found that the cost of supporting plaintiff's wife
would have been $17,000. It is plaintiff's position first
that the cost of support of plaintiff's wife may not be deducted at all and if it is deductible that it may only be
deducted as the trial court held, from the award that was
made in the cause of action where the jury was permitted
to take into account the value of the loss of plaintiff's
wife's services, namely the cause of action for alienation
of affections. It is also plaintiff's position that the trial
court erronously reduced the punitive damages from
$12,000 to $1,000.
POINT A
THE TRIAL COURT COMMI'TED ERROR AS A MATTER
OF LAW AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN V ACA'TING
THE JURY'S AWARD OF $12,000 PUNITIVE DAMAGES
AND SUBSTITUTING $1,000 THEREFOR. AS A MA'TTER OF
LAW THE JURY'S AWARD OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES
SHOULD BE REINSTATED.

Whether a trial court has abused its discretion in
vacating the jury's award of punitive damages turns on
the facts and circumstances of the particular case .. To
cite other cases from our jurisdiction and other jurisdictions where trial courts have been reversed for vacating
the juries' awards of punitive damages would serve no
useful purpose.
The facts and circumstances of the case before this
court and in particular the deliberate conduct of the defendant, extending over a period of in excess of twelve
months, in going secretively to plaintiff's home, making
love to plaintiff's wife in the sanctity of plaintiff's home
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and in the presence of plaintiff's children, kissing plaintiff's wife in plaintiff's home and in the presence of plaintiff's children, drinking with plaintiff's wife in plaintiff's
home and in the presence of plaintiff's children, taking
plaintiff's wife openly to public dance halls, taking plaintiff's wife openly on excursions, and in debauching and
defiling plaintiff's wife by having sexual intercourse with
her on many occasions over a long period of time, and in
making a deliberate conquest of plaintiff's wife, all in
complete disregard of the moral standards of society and
in complete disregard of the sanctity of plaintiff's home
and marriage, amply supports the jury's award of $12,000
punitive damages. The la-w permits the jury to award
punitive da1nages for the purpose of setting a value on
the moral standards of the conununity and the violation
thereof, for the purpose of operating as a deterent to
like conduct by others, and for the purpose of punishing
the defendant. The very purpose of permitting a jury to
assess punitive damage is to pernrit a jury of eight representatives of the cmnmunity rather than one trial
judge, whose standard of 1norals and background may be
different from that of the conununity. to determine the
value of a deliberate and wilful Yiolation of the standards
of the

communit~~.

To pern1it the trial judge on the facts

and circumstances of this case to vacate the jury's award
of $12,000 punitive da1nages is to pennit the trial judge
to arbitrarily and capriciously substitute his standard of
value of the 1norals of the conununity for that of the jury
and

tlH'rC'b~,

to deprive the plaintiff of his right to a trial

by jury. See E·l ans vs. Gaisford, (1952) 122 U. 156, 247
1
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P.2d 431 in which this court in discussing punitive damages said at 247 P.2d, page 435:
''Punitive or exemplary damages are awarded
as a punishment to the defendant for malicious
conduct and as a wholesome warning to defendant
and others not to engage in similar transactions.
* * * Because there is no method of precise calculation as to the quantum of such damages, the
amount thereof must necessarily be left to the
sound discretion of the jury as related to the facts
and circumstances in each individual case. The
only limitation thereon is that they must not be so
disproportionate to the injury and the actual damage as to plainly manifest that they were the result of passion and prejudice rather than reason
and justice applied to the existing facts.''
All that one needs to do in order to determine whether or

not the jury's award of $12,000 punitive damages was
"disproportionate to the injuries'' sustained by the plaintiff in the case before this court is to contemplate the
situation of an innocent man whose wife has been deliberately defiled and debauched and the sanctity of whose
home and family has been violated by the deliberate,
malicious and persistent conquest of a wrongdoer.
To permit the trial judge in this case to substitute
his judgment for the judgment of the jury is to permit
the trial judge to, "usurp judicial power and prostitute
the constitutional trial by jury". Uptown Appliance vs.
Flint (1952) 122 U. 298, 249 P.2d 826.
POINT B
COST OF SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S WIFE IS NOT
DEDUCTIBLE AT ALL.
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All of the cases cited by defendant in support of the
proposition that the cost of supporting the wife is deductible are old cases. Lankford vs. Tombari, 35 Wash.2d 412,
213 P.2d 627, involved an action for alienation of affections and criminal conversation. In that case the defendant requested the following instruction,
"You are further instructed that in the event
you find for the plaintiff on the first cause of
action that the plaintiff is entitled to only one recovery for loss of consortium which is made up
generally of the loss of company, the loss of services and plaintiff's mental agony, lacerated feeling, wounded sensibilities and love.
You are further instructed, however, that as
to any loss of services there shall be a deduction
because of the plaintiff's duty to cloth, support
and care for his wife."
The Washington Supreme Court said,
"The requested instruction is not the law and
it was not error to refuse it.''
We think the late \Vashington case correctly states the
law in holding that a deduction for cost of support should
not be permitted. It should also be noted that defendant
has not cited one late ease that holds the cost of support
may be deducted. The \Yashington case cited above is
the only case that plaintiff through diligent research
has been able to find involving the question of whether
or not eost of supporting a wife is deductible. The fact
that that issue is not involved in any of the later alienation of affections or erhninal conversation eases is somewhat significant. It is also significant that the only late
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case that either defendant or plaintiff has apparently
been able to find, namely the Washington case cited
above, holds that the cost of support is not deductible at
all.
27 Am. Jur., Sec. 545, page 146 states,
"There is disagreement as to whether there
should be a deduction from a husband's recovery
for loss of his wife's services because of his duty
to cloth, support and care for her."
Restatement of Torts, Vol. 3 Sec. 683 (k) states the
various elements that may be considered in fixing damages where the husband sues for alienation of his wife's
affections. Nothing is said about deducting the cost of
support at all. If cost of support was deductible, the authors of the Restatement certainly would have said something about it. Section 685 (e) of the same volume of the
Restatement in discussing the elements of damage in an
action for criminal conversation is likewise silent as to
the deductiblity of cost of support.
POINT C
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDI~CIAL ERROR AND ABUSED I'TS DISCRETION IN GRANTING A
NEW TRIAL AT THE CLOSE OF THE FIRST TRIAL OF
THIS ACTION.

If, but only if, the court should determine that prejudicial error of some kind was committed at the second
trial that would require a reversal, then plaintiff urges
the court to reinstate the verdict of the jury that was returned in the amount of $25,000 at the first trial, and
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that the Supreme Court order judgment entered with
interest thereon from the date of the verdict on the first
trial. That interest should be allowed from date of verdict
see, Hewitt vs. General Tire and Rubber Co., 5 U.2d 379,
302 P.2d 712. It should be noted that defendant does not
claim that any error was committed at the first trial. If
such a claim is made, it has not been argued in defendant's brief. We submit that there was no error and we
submit in view of the verdict that has been returned by
two separate juries in this matter and in view of the
evidence adduced at both trials, that the trial court
abused its discretion on the first trial in granting a new
trial on grounds of excessive damages, and if the court
should find there is reversible error on the second trial
then we very sincerely urge the Supreme Court to reinstate the verdict that was returned on the first trial.

CONCLUSION
Plaintiff urges the Supreme Court to make the following alternative rulings:
First: Hold that the cost of support of plaintiff's
wife is not deductible at all and to reinstate all of the
punitive dmnages that were awarded at the second trial
and to order the entnT of judg1nent in favor of the plaintiff for the su1n of $39,500 with interest thereon from the
date of the second verdict.
Second: To affinn the judgment entered after the
second trial.
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Third : If, but only if, reversible error should be
found to have been committed at the second trial, that
the Supreme Court reinstate the verdict that was returned at the first trial and order entry of judgment in favor
of the plaintiff for the sum of $25,000 with interest thereon from the date of the first verdict.
Respectfully submitted,
McBROOM & HANNI,
Attorneys for PlaintiJff
and Respondent.
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